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NEUTRALITY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF "FAITH-BASED
AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES" AFTER
AGOSTINI AND MITCHELL
KYLE FoRSYTH*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ten days into his presidency, George W. Bush unveiled a
proposal to expand Charitable Choice:
The paramount goal is compassionate results, and private
and charitable community groups, including religious
ones, should have the fullest opportunity permitted by law
to compete on a level playing field, so long as they achieve
valid public purposes, such as curbing crime, conquering
addiction, strengthening families and neighborhoods, and
overcoming poverty. The delivery of social services must
be results oriented and should value the bedrock principles of pluralism, nondiscrimination, evenhandedness, and
neutrality.'
With this pronouncement on January 29, 2001, the President

formed the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives and took his first official step toward delivering on one
of his principal campaign promises.' That promise was, of
course, his pledge to further devolve the federal welfare system
by partnering the government with private faith-based and community groups to provide social services to Americans in need.
On July 19, 2001, the United States House of Representatives

passed a version of Bush's proposal. 3
This Note shall discuss President Bush's proposal for FaithBased and Community Initiatives (FBCI), examining the debate
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; White Scholar, Thomas
J. White Center on Law & Government, 2001-2003; B.A., Whitworth College,
1999. Many thanks to my fellow staff members of the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy, without whose invaluable assistance this Note
would not have been possible. I must also recognize Professor Julia Stronks at
Whitworth College. Were it not for her encouragement and guidance I never
would have found my way to Notre Dame. And, most importantly, with deep
gratitude I thank my family for their love, support, and tireless prayers.
1. Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,497 (Jan. 31, 2001).
2. Id.
3. Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001).
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that exists regarding its constitutionality under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. In light of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in Agostini v. Felton4 and Mitchell v. Helms,5 the
proposal comports with the Establishment Clause and passes constitutional muster. This conclusion about the FBCI program's
constitutionality is not uncontroversial, and it will be necessary to
examine carefully both the Agostini and Mitchell opinions as they
apply to the FBCI proposal. In particular, it should prove helpful
to evaluate how these opinions bear upon the two primary methods by which government aid is to be distributed in the FBCI
program. The first method is when the government gives vouchers to needy individuals who can then redeem them for services
at the provider of their choice. 6 Under the second method, the
government gives money directly to private service organizations
either by grants or contracts. 7 Some of these organizations
receiving federal aid would be religiously affiliated.
Before undertaking any First Amendment analysis it will be
helpful to set forth in some detail the pertinent elements of the
FBCI program as proposed in the bill passed by the House in July
2001.
II.

OUTLINE OF LEGISLATION TO EXPAND

CHARITABLE CHOICE:

FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES

The legislation considered here is a portion of H.R. 7 known
as the "Charitable Choice Act of 2001" (the Act). 8
A.

The Act's Stated Purposes

The Act enumerates several purposes that it is designed to
achieve. Foremost among these is the goal to improve the effectiveness and efficiency with which social providers assist needy
individuals and families. 9 One way in which the Act seeks to
achieve these improvements is by expanding the network of
social service providers by enlisting the help of "religious and
other community organizations." 10 Further, the Act lifts a burden on religious social service providers by prohibiting governmental discrimination against them in the distribution of
4.

521 U.S. 203 (1997).

5.
6.

530 U.S. 793 (2000).
H.R. 7, § 201 (h) (2).

7. Id. § 201 (h) (1).
8. Id. § 201(a).
9. Id.§ 201(b)(1).
10. Id.§ 201 (b) (2).
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funding for service programs.'. Likewise, the Act maintains that
religiously affiliated service providers should not be required to
surrender their religious character or sacrifice their essential2
autonomy in order to participate in governmental programs.1
Finally, and very importantly, the Act seeks to protect against
religious establishment by ensuring the religious freedom of individuals and families that receive services from publicly funded
providers. 13
B.

Treating Religious and Nonreligious OrganizationsNeutrally

1. Funds Available on Equal Basis for Achieving Secular
Purposes
For all programs described in the Act and involving federal
funds, the government must consider religious and nonreligious
service providers equally. The government is prohibited from
excluding any social service organization on the basis that it is
religious.' 4 With neutrality in mind, the Act expressly states that
money flowing from the government to religious organizations
constitutes "aid to individuals and families in need.... not support for" any religious beliefs or practices. 15 The Act also disavows any endorsement of religion through the distribution of
funds for social services. 6
Accordingly, federal funds may flow to private organizations
(whether religious or nonreligious) only if those organizations
are delivering services that promote the secular goals of one of
several pre-existing federal programs. 7 Therefore, private organizations qualifying for federal funding must address at least one
of the following areas: juvenile delinquency, crime prevention,
assistance to crime victims and offenders' families, housing, job
skills training, domestic violence, hunger relief, commuter transportation, or alternative education. 8
2.

Preserving Organizational Character and Autonomy

An infusion of federal funding is always accompanied by
necessary federal oversight and control. However, recognizing
that religious organizations have in the past been asked to
11.

Id. § 201 (b) (3).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. § 201 (b) (4).
Id. § 201 (b) (5).
Id. § 201 (c) (1).
Id. § 201 (c) (2).
Id. § 201 (c) (3).
Id. § 201 (c) (4).

18.

See id. § 201 (c) (4) (i)-(viii).
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divorce their beliefs from their service in ways that secular organizations have not, the Act offers the following safeguards for
religious liberty. Most fundamentally, religious groups retain
their right to control their religious beliefs and practices.1 9
Therefore, federal, state, and local governments may not require
a religious organization participating in a federally funded program to change its internal form of governance, nor to remove
religious art, symbols, or scripture from its premises, nor to
change its name because of its religious character.2 °
Recognizing that a religious organization cannot maintain
its character without employees who share a commitment to a
common creed, the Act permits religious groups to make personnel decisions on the basis of religion. 2 ' Notably, this provision
does not extend new benefits to religious organizations, but simply preserves their rights expressly granted under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.22 Nothing in the Act, however, exempts participating religious organizations from federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination based on race, color, national origin, and, in
specific contexts, sex, physical impairment, and age.2 C.

1.

Protectingthe Rights of Individuals and
FamiliesReceiving Assistance

Governmental Obligation to Provide Services to Which
Beneficiaries Do Not Have Religious Objections

The Act respects the rights of individuals and families not to
be forced to receive services in an objectionable religious environment. Therefore, it requires federal, state, and local governments to provide alternative services to beneficiaries who object
to the religious character of the organization that provides, or
would provide, their services.2 4
These alternative services must not be religiously objectionable to the beneficiaries, and they must provide value at least
equal to that of the services the beneficiaries would have received
had they not raised a religious objection. 25 To ensure the effectiveness of this safeguard against religious establishment, the Act
directs the appropriate government entity to notify beneficiaries
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. § 201 (d)(1).
Id. § 201 (d) (2).
Id.§ 201(e).
Id. (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994)).

23. Id. § 201(f).
24. Id.§ 201 (g)(1).
25. Id.
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of this 26right to receive services to which they do not religiously
object.
2.

Religious Providers of Services May Not Discriminate
Against Beneficiaries Based on Religion

Honoring the bedrock principle that government funds are
not to be used to benefit one particular religious group or sect,
the Act requires participating religious organizations to provide
services to all beneficiaries without regard to their religion or
irreligion. 27 The Act expressly states that service providers shall
a relignot deny benefits to individuals "on the basis of religion,
28
ious belief, or a refusal to hold a religious belief.
D.

Keeping Private OrganizationsAccountablefor Their
Use of Public Funds

Because the funding flowing from the government to religious organizations does not constitute aid to religion, participating religious organizations cannot use the funds for "sectarian
instruction, worship, or proselytization."2 9 If religious organizations do provide such activities in addition to social services,
these activities must be completely voluntary and offered separately from the programs receiving public funding.3 0 Private
organizations that partner with the government to provide services under the Act shall be required to audit and give an
account of their use of public funds.3"
At the same time, the Act addresses concerns about excessive governmental entanglement with religion by limiting this
audit to funds received as direct aid from the government.
Parishioner donations and indirect public aid such as vouchers
can be segregated into separate accounts not subject to governmental oversight. 2 Additionally, participating religious organizations shall conduct annual self-audits, checking for compliance
with the Act's requirements such as religious neutrality toward
beneficiaries, and appropriate use of funds.33 In this manner,
governmental "entanglement" is minimized while public
accountability is maintained.
§ 201 (g) (2).
§ 201(h).
§§ 201 (h)(1)-(2).
§ 201(j).

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

30.

Id.

31.
32.
33.

Id. § 201(i).
Id. § 201 (i) (2).
Id. § 201 (i) (3).
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Provision of Training and Technical Assistance to
Small Private Organizations

One of the FBCI program's primary objectives is to increase
the government's cooperation with smaller, local social service
providers. 4 To promote this goal, the Act provides for programs
to train small and new private organizations (both religious and
nonreligious) in procedures for navigating the federal bureaucracy in search of funds for social service providers.3 5 Under the
Act, available assistance could include workshops and other training to help small, private groups form tax-exempt 501(c) (3)
organizations, and to explain how to comply with federal
accounting, tax, and nondiscrimination requirements.16 While
such funds would be generally available to all private social service organizations, the Act expressly requires that smaller groups
receive priority in the distribution."
III.

GLEANING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

38

Having set forth the FBCI program's main elements, this discussion can move to analysis of the Act's constitutionality. As
noted above, two recent Supreme Court opinions have redefined
the boundaries of permissible cooperation between church and
state. In its 1997 Agostini opinion, the Court held that a federally
funded Title I program sending public school teachers into private religious schools to give secular instruction during school
hours did not violate the Establishment Clause. 39 Then in 2000,
the Court decided Mitchell, another case involving federal aid to
private religious schools.4" The Court held that the Establishment Clause permitted federal lending of educational materials
to religious schools.4 1 Neither of these cases presented a federal
program identical to the FBCI proposal, but their principles
form the basis of the following analysis, beginning with Agostini.
34. See THE WHITE HOUSE, UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD: BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION BY FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN FEDERAL SERVICE PRO-

GRAMS 20-23 (2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/08/20010816-3-report.pdf [hereinafter UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD] (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).

35.

H.R. 7, § 201(o).

36.

Id. § 201(o)(2).

37.
38.

Id. § 201(o)(4).

For my understanding of Agostini, Mitchell, and the rest of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, I am deeply indebted to Professor Richard
Garnett and his excellent course on the First Amendment.
39. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997).
40. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
41. Id. at 835.
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A.

Agostini v. Felton: Refining the Lemon Test

Agostini involved federal Title I funds that were statutorily
required to be available to all eligible children whether they
attended public or private schools. The Title I funds flowed
from the federal government to the states, then to local education agencies (LEAs). The LEAs would then distribute the funds
for remedial education, guidance and job counseling for eligible
students.4 2 Funds distributed to aid private school children were
subject to stricter regulation than those that benefited children
in public schools. For example, the funds for private schools
could not be used in any school-wide programs, but had to be
targeted specifically for eligible students. Furthermore, the LEA
had to retain control over the funds rather than allowing private
schools to manage them, Title I services had to be supplied by
persons independent of the private schools, and the services
themselves had to be "secular, neutral, and nonideological," and
43
be supplemental to the private schools' pre-existing programs.
Prior to delivering Title I instruction at private schools,
teachers were given instructions about the program's secular purpose and how they should conduct themselves so as not to compromise that purpose. They were not to introduce religious
materials or ideas into their instruction or to become involved
with the religious activities of the school.4 4 Religious symbols
were to be stripped from classrooms where Title I instruction
occurred. 45 Finally, public officials were to make unannounced
monthly visits to these classrooms to see that these secular guidelines were being followed.4 6
Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice O'Connor declared
that the Title I program did not violate any of the three primary
criteria the Court uses to determine if government aid has the
impermissible effect of advancing religion.4 7 These three criteria
are: 1) the government aid must not result in indoctrination, 2)
it must not define its recipients by reference to religion, and 3) it
must not create an excessive entanglement of government and
religion.4 8
First, as to the indoctrination issue, the Court reasoned that
the mere presence of a public employee on parochial school
42. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209.
43. Id. at 210.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

211.
211-12.
212.
234.
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grounds, without more, did not result in impermissible government-sponsored indoctrination.4 9 Neither did such presence
constitute a "symbolic link" between the government and religion.5" Agostini further rejected the notion that a federally funded
program could result in religious indoctrination simply because
it reached a large number of recipients affiliated with religious
organizations.5 1
The Agostini Court relied on Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothill School
District and Mueller v. Allen to disavow this method of strict
numerical analysis.5 2 It noted that the outcome in Zobrest had
not depended on the fact that James Zobrest was the only student using a state-funded sign-language interpreter in a parochial school. 5' Further, the Court quoted the following language
from Mueller to support its decision: "We would be loath to adopt
a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on
classes of priannual reports reciting the extent to which various
54
vate citizens claimed benefits under the law."
Second, the Agostini Court considered the criteria by which
beneficiaries were selected. It noted that selection criteria were
important because they might advance religion by creating
incentives for religious participation.5 5 However, because the
Title I program applied to all eligible students regardless of their
religion or the religious or secular status of their schools, the
Court concluded that the program neither favored nor hampered religion. Importantly, these religion-neutral selection criteria did not give students or parents any incentive to alter their
religious beliefs or practices. 56 Before announcing its conclusion
on this issue, the Court recalled several other neutrally distributed aid programs that had complied with the Establishment
Clause. These included, among others, reimbursement to parents for public and private school bussing, 57 loans of secular text49. Id. at 223 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993)). In Zobrest the Court held that it was permissible for a state-employed
sign language interpreter to sign for a deaf student at his Roman Catholic high
school. Id. at 13.

50.

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 224.

51.
52.

Id. at 229.
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1; Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).

53.

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229 (discussing Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1).

54.

Id. at 230 (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401).

55.
56.

Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 232.

57.
(1947)).

Id. at 231 (citing Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16-18
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books to all students in public and private schools, 58 and funding
for vocational training for blind persons even when one aid
recipient used those funds to train as a Christian minister.
Third, the Court resolved that the Title I program did not
result in excessive entanglement between government and religion. In analyzing whether such entanglement existed, the Court
looked to the following factors: "the character and purposes of
the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and religious authority."6 It held that neither concerns
about administrative cooperation between religious organizations and government, nor concerns about political divisiveness
were sufficient to constitute excessive entanglement. 6 '
One entanglement concern the Court did consider was the
need for governmental monitoring of religious organizations.
However, it dismissed this as insufficient to cause excessive entanglement. In the wake of Zobrest,62 the Court reasoned, it would
no longer presume public employees would inculcate religion
whenever they stepped foot into a sectarian environment.6
Therefore, because publicly-funded employees can largely be
trusted to refrain from religious indoctrination, the need for governmental monitoring of religious organizations is not pervasive
but limited.6 4 The once-per-month unannounced classroom
vis65
its by public officials were not "excessive entanglement.
In summary, Agostini clarified the Court's modification of
the Lemon test.66 It retained the first Lemon prong requiring the
58. Id. (citing Bd. of Ed. of Central Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
243-44 (1968)).
59. Id. (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
487-88 (1986)).
60. Id. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
61. Id. at 233-34.
62. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
63. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (setting forth the
famous three-prong Lemon test for Establishment Clause compliance: Government action must 1) have a secular purpose, 2) not have a primary effect of
either advancing or inhibiting religion, and 3) not create an excessive entanglement between government and religion). In Lemon, the Court considered two
statutes enacted by the legislatures of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. The
Rhode Island statute required the state to supplement the salaries of teachers
who taught only secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools. Rhode
Island would pay a supplement of up to fifteen percent of such teachers' salaries, provided that this supplement did not cause any recipient's salary to
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government to act with a valid secular purpose.6 7 Agostini also
preserved the second Lemon prong, the "effects" test. However,
the Court revised the criteria it uses to make this "effects"
inquiry. It set forth three elements to the analysis, the third of
which incorporated
the Lemon "entanglement" prong into the
"effects" inquiry.6 8 This reduced the "entanglement" analysis to
being just one factor contributing to a program's "effect" on
advancing or inhibiting religion. The result was a two-prong test:
1) does the program have a valid secular purpose? and 2) does
the program have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion?6 9 The Court's three "effects" factors are reviewed in the
following paragraphs.
First, government aid to religious organizations must not
sponsor religious indoctrination. 7 ' The mere presence of a public employee working in a sectarian environment does not cause
such indoctrination, nor does it establish a "symbolic link"
between government and religion. 7 ' Nor does a publicly funded
program result in indoctrination simply because a significant
number of its beneficiaries are religious individuals or
organizations.72
Second, government aid can only flow to religious organizations if it does so as part of a religion-neutral distribution process. 73 Distribution criteria must not benefit one religious group
over another, or religion over irreligion because such criteria
would create incentives for individuals to alter their religious
practices or beliefs.7 ' The Court has many times upheld programs that happen to give aid to religious individuals or organizations as a result of religion-neutral distribution systems.7 5
exceed the maximum salary of public school teachers. Under the Pennsylvania
statute the state reimbursed nonpublic schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks,
and other materials insofar as these were used for secular instruction. No state
money could be used for materials used in classes with religious instruction or
worship. The Court invalidated both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes on the ground that they resulted in an excessive entanglement between
government and religion. SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWE.s THAT ARE 378-85 (1987).
67. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23 ("we continue to ask whether the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion").
68. Id. at 234.
69. See id. at 222-23, 234.
70. Id. at 223.
71. Id. at 224.
72. Id. at 229-30.
73. Id. at 231.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing numerous cases).
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Third, government aid to religious organizations must not
result in excessive entanglement between government and religion.76 It is not altogether clear what would in the Court's view
constitute such entanglement. But the Agostini decision states at
least that monthly visits to religious school classrooms by public
officials do not rise to this level. 7 7 Moreover, public employees
working in sectarian environments can generally be trusted to
conduct their duties without inculcating religion. The effect of
this presumption is that pervasive governmental monitoring is
not required.7 8 Finally, neither administrative cooperation
between religious and government officials,
nor political divisive79
ness constitutes excessive entanglement.
Three years after Agostini, the Court in Mitchelt3 again
upheld a program giving government aid to religious schools.
Analysis of Mitchell follows below.
B.

Mitchell v. Helms: Neutral Aid ProgramsAre Not Endorsement

Mitchell involved a federal education program known as
Chapter 2.81 Through Chapter 2 the federal government
granted money to state and local government agencies which dis82
tributed the funds to all public and nonprofit private schools.
This distribution was based entirely on the number of students
attending a school, with each school receiving the same amount
per student.8 3 Aid flowed to public and private schools in the
form of instructional and educational materials.
As was true in Agostini, the government placed several
restrictions on the federal aid to private schools. Chapter 2
funds could only be used to supplement a private school's normal budget and could not supplant funds from non-federal
sources.8 " The nature of the aid was of particular concern.
Under Chapter 2, aid to private schools had to be "secular, neutral, and nonideological."8 5 Additionally, local educational agencies (LEAs) retained title to all loaned materials, and controlled
all funding received through Chapter 2. Approximately thirty
76.
77.

Id. at 232.
Id. at 234.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 233-34.

80.

Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).

81.

Id. at 801.

82.

Id. at 802. These agencies are local educational agencies (LEAs) just

as in Agostini.

83.
84.
85.

Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-73).
Id. at 802.
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a) (1)).
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percent of the funds distributed by the local LEA went to forty-six
private schools. Of these, forty-one were religiously affiliated.8 6
With its Mitchell opinion, the Supreme Court determined
Chapter 2's constitutional status under the Establishment Clause.
Six justices held that Chapter 2 was not a law respecting an establishment of religion and voted to uphold the program. Justice
Thomas wrote for a four-justice plurality. Justice O'Connor
wrote for herself and Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment. i v Although Justice Thomas' plurality opinion garnered
more votes than any other on the Court, it was Justice
O'Connor's less sweeping opinion that established the boundaries of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.8 8 For
this reason, after framing the issues presented to the Court, this
Note will sketch the plurality opinion only briefly before examining more fully Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the
judgment.8 9
Both opinions made repeated references to Agostini. The
parties agreed that Chapter 2 had a valid, secular purpose.
Because in Agostini the Court had reduced the Lemon test from
three prongs to two, this left the Court only to decide whether
the Chapter 2 program had the effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion. Proceeding to this "effects" analysis, the Court could
further pare its inquiry because the parties did not claim any
excessive entanglement between government and religion.
Therefore, it had only two "effects" factors to consider: 1)
whether Chapter 2 resulted in governmental religious indoctrination, and 2) whether the government distributed the aid on a
religion-neutral basis.
1. The Mitchell Plurality
The four members of the plurality began this two-part
inquiry by checking for governmental religious indoctrination.
Their test for impermissible religious indoctrination was whether
any indoctrination that occurred "could reasonably be attributed
to governmental action."9 ° They made this "attribution" determination, in turn, by deciding whether the federal aid was dis86. Id. at 803.
87. Id. at 801, 836.
88. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (recognizing that
when the Supreme Court does not issue a majority opinion, the opinion concurring in the judgment on the narrowest grounds establishes controlling
precedent).
89. For a helpful, and extremely brief, summary of the plurality's opinion, see Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
90. Id. at 809 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997)).
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tributed in a religion-neutral manner.9" The plurality contended
that if all organizations-whether religious, irreligious, or areligious-were eligible for aid no one could reasonably have concluded the government had supported any indoctrination. 92 It
then made the following statement about the importance of
religion-neutral distribution criteria:
[I]f the government, seeking to further some legitimate
secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without
regard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose, then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious
recipient only has the effect of furthering that secular
purpose.9 3
From these premises, the plurality proceeded to form an elegant rule for determining whether government aid advances
religion: such aid does not advance religion if the aid itself is not
religious in content,9 4 and the aid is made available to all recipients based on religion-neutral criteria.9 5 The plurality considered it unimportant if content-neutral government aid was
diverted by a private entity for religious uses.96 Finally, the plurality greatly diminished the importance of the distinction
between direct and indirect aid.9 7
2.

The Mitchell Concurrence in the Judgment

Like the justices in the plurality, Justices O'Connor and
Breyer decided that the Chapter 2 program provided contentneutral aid, and distributed that aid in a religion-neutral manner. This was not enough, however, for them to conclude that
Chapter 2 did not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion. First, the concurring justices rejected, or at least
refused to join, the plurality's position that neutral content plus
neutral distribution equaled no advancement of religion.9" Second, their concurrence asked if the aid had been diverted to
91.

Id. at 809.

92.

Id.

93.

Id. at 810 (citation omitted).

94.

Id. at 822.

95. Id. at 813.
96. Id. at 820. For example, neutral aid would be diverted to religious use
if an overhead projector were used to teach a sectarian theology class.
97. Id. at 817-19 (dismissing the direct/indirect distinction as an exaltation of form over substance, but reserving the possibility that it might play a role
in some "special" cases) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)).
98. Id. at 837.
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religious uses.9 9 Because the concurring justices found on the
facts that no indoctrination had occurred, and that any diversion
of aid for religious purposes had been de minimis, they concurred
in the judgment to uphold Chapter 2.100
Two aspects of the concurrence merit closer attention.
These are its discussion about the diversion of funds to religious
uses and the distinction between direct and indirect aid to religious organizations. Unlike the plurality, the concurrence conditioned its approval of Chapter 2 on the fact that federal funds
10
were not diverted except for possible de minimis exceptions. '
However, the concurrence made no presumption that government aid-though capable of being diverted to religious useswas in fact employed for religious purposes. The concurrence
recalled that in Agostini the Court emphasized the impropriety of
presuming government aid would be used to advance religion.
Instead, the plaintiff raising an Establishment Clause claim bears
the burden of proving that the aid was used to promote religious
indoctrination. 0 2
According to the concurrence, diversion in Mitchell could
only be found if one were to "presume bad faith on the part of
the religious school officials.""0 3 However, no such diversion
could be found because it was "entirely proper to presume that
these school officials [would] act in good faith."1" 4 An important
corollary of presuming good faith compliance with secular use
guidelines is that the government need not pervasively monitor
religious recipients of aid. This reduces the likelihood of excessive entanglement between government and religion.
One final note on the diversion of funds fits neatly into the
following discussion of direct versus indirect aid. Specifically,
according to the concurrence, diversion of public funds to religious uses is not problematic if it occurs as the result of "genuinely
independent and private choices of aid recipients. ' 105 The dis99. Id. at 837-38, 857.
100. Id. at 867. Justice O'Connor also identified other factors that contributed to the decision to uphold the program: 1) the aid supplemented rather
than supplanted non-federal funds, 2) the aid never "reached the coffers" of
religious schools, and 3) the program included "adequate safeguards" against
governmental advancement of religion. Significantly, she indicated that while
this combination of factors was "surely sufficient" to uphold the program, they
might not all be "constitutional requirements." Id.
101. Id. at 840, 867.
102. Id. at 857-58.
103. Id. at 863.
104. Id. at 863-64.
105. Id. at 841 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).
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tinction between direct and indirect aid is extremely important
in cases where government aid ultimately supports religious activities. In fact, the concurrence indicates that this direct/indirect
distinction is determinative. Direct aid is that aid that flows
straight from the government to a religious organization without
first passing through the hands of private individuals.1" 6 Naturally enough, indirect aid is aid that the government distributes
to individuals who then make a private, independent choice
about where to put that aid to use.10 7 A familiar example of indirect aid is a voucher that can be used by recipients to attend
schools of their choosing. 108
Applying these categories in Mitchell, the concurrence found
Chapter 2's per-capita aid program to constitute direct aid.10 9
The justices concurring in the judgment offered three reasons
supporting this determination. First, they noted that the per-capita distribution flowed directly to the schools without ever being
controlled by the children's families." 0 However, the money
earmarked for each student went to a given school based solely
on the student's decision to attend. Nevertheless, the concurrence still deemed this direct aid because the student, apart from
choosing a religious or secular school, did not have control over
whether the government aid would be used to benefit a religious
institution."' I
Second, the concurrence argued that the distinction
between an indirect voucher system and a "direct" per-capita distribution system affected public perceptions about government
106.

See id. at 841.

107.

Id.

108. In June, 2002, the Supreme Court upheld the Cleveland City School
District's vouchers program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460
(2002). Vouchers providing tuition assistance were distributed directly to the
parents of school children who then applied the vouchers to schools of their
choosing. If parents chose to send their children to private schools, checks
were made payable to the parents who then endorsed the checks over to the
chosen school. Thus, "[w] here tuition aid is spent depends solely upon where
parents who receive tuition aid choose to enroll their child." Id. at 2464. The
Court's opinion focused heavily on the indirect nature of the Cleveland
voucher program's aid to religion. Therefore, the Zelman analysis does not
apply as directly to the FBCI proposal as do Agostini and Mitchell, and further
discussion of Zelman is unmerited in the context of this Note.
109. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 843. Apparently Justice O'Connor envisioned parents who
would choose to send their children to religious schools, but because of their
refined view of the Establishment Clause would desire to refund the aid back to
the government rather than have it benefit their children's education.
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endorsement of religion.1 1 2 If the aid flowed directly to religious
schools on a per-capita basis, and if that aid were then used to
inculcate religion, the public would likely perceive a governmental endorsement of religion. However, if private individuals
served as independent intermediaries between the government
and religious schools, a different situation would exist. There,
any religious use of the aid would be far enough removed from
the government's decisions that no reasonable observer would
likely conclude any governmental endorsement of religion had
occurred.

1 13

Third, and finally, the concurrence asserted that the difference between direct and indirect aid programs is particularly
important when the aid consists of monetary subsidies.11 4 Aid
flowing to religious organizations in the form of cash payments
was an activity the Court had previously identified as one raising
"special Establishment Clause dangers.""' 5 The concurrence did
not explain why these "special dangers" exist, but one rationale
could be that cash is fungible and may be more easily diverted to
religious uses than other forms of aid.
To summarize, the effect of the concurrence's view on the
direct/indirect distinction is that direct aid cannot be used for
religious purposes, but indirect aid can possibly be put to such
religious uses. 116 It is important to recognize that this does not
place a ban on direct aid to religious organizations; it merely
restricts the application of such aid to secular uses only.'
3.

The Establishment Clause: Lessons From Mitchell

Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the judgment is more
constrained than the plurality opinion of Justice Thomas. Thus,
the rules emerging from Mitchell are derived from the concurrence." 8 Pared to its essentials, Mitchell stands for the following
four propositions:
1. The three-prong Lemon test has now become a twoprong test. Federal aid programs must have a secular
purpose and must not have the primary effect of advanc112.
113.

Id. at 843.
Id.

114.

Id.

115. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. at 842).
116. Id. at 841.
117. The concurrence did, after all, characterize the per-capita aid program as direct aid, yet held that it lay well within the bounds of the Establishment Clause. See id. at 841, 867.
118. See supra note 88.
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ing or inhibiting religion.' 19 The third Lemon prongthe restriction on excessive entanglement-is subsumed
into the "primary effects" analysis. The three subtests
for primary effects require that a) the government aid
does not result in governmental religious indoctrination, b) the aid is distributed according to religion-neutral criteria, and c) the aid does not result in excessive
20
entanglement between government and religion.'
Indirect government aid that flows to religious organizations only by the independent choices of private individuals does not violate the Establishment Clause even
when such aid is applied to religious uses. 1 2 1 " [T]he fact
that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to
support religious education is made by the individual,
not by the State. 1

3.

4.

THE ESTABIJSHMEAr' CLAUSE

22

The role of the private decision-

maker is central to the analysis because it diffuses claims
that the government has engaged in religious
endorsement.
The Establishment Clause permits direct government
aid to flow to religious organizations without first passing through the hands of private individuals, but only if
such aid is not applied to religious uses.' 23 The Court's
approval of direct aid programs relies in part on the fact
that the aid is not "used to advance 124the religious missions" of the recipient organizations.
Finally, there is to be no presumption that content-neutral aid that flows from government to religious organizations will be diverted for impermissible (religious)
uses.1 25 Indeed it is "entirely proper to presume that
[aid recipients] will act in good faith. '' 12 ' According to

the Court's opinion in Agostini this presumption of good
faith compliance removes the need for pervasive governmental monitoring of aid recipients. 27 This naturally
119. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807-08 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
222-23 (1997)).
120. Id. (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234).
121.

See id. at 841.

122. Id. at 842 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481, 493 (1986)).
123. Id. at 840.
124. Id. (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226-27).
125. Id. at 863-64.
126. Id.
127. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
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entanglement between
reduces the risks of excessive
1 28
government and religion.

It now remains only to apply the principles of Agostini and
Mitchell to H.R. 7, the bill that would expand Charitable Choice
and implement President Bush's proposals for partnering the
with faith-based and community
federal government
29
organizations.1
IV.

APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

Under Agostini and Mitchell, the FBCI program is consistent
with the constraints of the Establishment Clause. While the First
Amendment's prohibition of laws "respecting an establishment
of religion" is a vital guarantor of Americans' sacred liberty,
defining "establishment" requires critical thought.' 0 The
Court's opinions demonstrate that there is not an absolute ban
on government money flowing to religious organizations.
The government effectively puts money into the pockets of
religious groups in a number of ways. These include: property
tax exemptions for religious organizations; personal income tax
deductions for donations to non-profit organizations (both religious and nonreligious); federally subsidized financial aid that students can spend at either religious or secular colleges or
universities; and welfare recipients tithing part of their (govern13
ment subsidized) income to their local religious congregation. '
These examples include both direct and indirect flow of aid to
religious organizations. Most constitute indirect aid that flows to
religious organizations only due to the choices of private individuals, but property tax exemptions benefit religious groups solely
at the behest of government.
It should be clear by now that the government may, in particular instances, enact policies and aid programs that benefit
religious groups. Of course the Establishment Clause places necessary limitations on how the government can do this, but it does
not completely ban aid that happens to benefit religion. The following analysis applies the limitations established by Mitchell and
(to a lesser extent) Agostini to the FBCI program as proposed in
the Charitable Choice Act of 2001.132
128.
129.

Id.

H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
131. Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'v 341, 342-43 (1999).
132. H.R. 7, § 201.
130.

NEUTRALITY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
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A.

Does the FBCI Program Have a Valid Secular Purpose?

The Act enumerates five purposes at the beginning of its
text. Listed first is the primary purpose of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency with which social assistance is administered to needy individuals and families.' 3 3 Providing food for the
hungry, shelter for the homeless, and treatment for the addicted
are surely valid secular purposes of the government. Thus, it
should be permissible for the government to enact legislation
with the purpose of improving its ability to achieve those important social welfare goals. After all, this purpose does not even
mention religion.
The second, third, and fourth purposes of the Act do mention religious organizations. However, they make mention of
religion only to demand that all private charitable groups be
treated equally, in a manner that does not discriminate based on
religious or nonreligious affiliation. 4 The equal treatment is
designed to expand the government's network of partners delivering social services, and thus to advance the goal of providing
for the needy more effectively and efficiently.
The Act specifically bans discrimination against religious
groups because these groups have historically been excluded
from government programs.13 5 With this ban on discrimination,
the Act lifts a burden from religious organizations and places
them on even footing with private nonreligious charities. Quite
simply, the Act does not set religion apart for special treatment;
it merely prevents the government from discriminating against
religion.
The Act's fifth stated purpose is to protect the religious freedom of needy individuals and families that receive social services
provided by the government or its private partners.1 36 If anything, this interjection of religion into the Act's purposes cuts
against establishment of religion. This "religious freedom" purpose safeguards against any recipient of government-sponsored
services being coerced into religious participation. All of the
Act's stated goals, therefore, point toward a valid secular purpose: increasing the government's ability to provide social services for its citizens in a way that honors these citizens'
fundamental rights.
By looking beyond the text of the bill, to secondary documents touting the merits of the FBCI proposal, one discovers yet
133.

Id. § 201 (b)(1).

134.
135.

Id. § 201 (b)(2)-(4).

136.

H.R. 7, § 201(b) (5).

UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD, supra note

34, at 2.
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more evidence for the program's secular purpose. For example,
President Bush's executive order establishing the White House
FBCI office declares that the plan seeks to help faith-based and
other community groups "strengthen their capacity to better
meet social needs in America's communities." 3 7 The order goes
on to state that the program's "paramount goal is compassionate
results

.

.

. such as curbing crime, conquering addiction,

strengthening families and neighborhoods, and overcoming poverty."'
The federal departments ofJustice, Labor, Housing and
Urban Development, Education, and Health and Human Services combat these issues every day. These are indeed valid secular purposes.
B.

Does the FBCI Program Have the Primary Effect
of Advancing Religion?

As Agostini and Mitchell instruct, there are three phases to
this inquiry into "primary effects." First, does the aid result in
governmental indoctrination? Second, is the aid distributed
based on religion-neutral criteria? And third, does the aid program cause excessive entanglement of government and
religion?1" 9
1. Does the FBCI Program Result in Governmental Religious
Indoctrination?
When determining if government aid results in religious
indoctrination, the threshold inquiry is whether the aid is religious in content. Even the plurality in Mitchell seems to require
that aid be religion-neutral and suitable for secular uses. 4 ' The
aid in Agostini was the secular instructional services of publicly
employed teachers.' 4 ' In Mitchell the aid was educational materials such as library books, computers, software, and audio/visual
equipment. 42 The valid educational purpose of such aid is selfevident.
Although the Act offers only a general description of the aid
it would provide, it does clearly indicate the secular purposes for
137. Exec. Order No. 13,198 (2001).
138. Id.
139. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
140. Id. at 823 ("The issue is ...whether the aid itself has an impermissible content. Where the aid would be suitable for use in a public school, it is
also suitable for use in any private school.").
141. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-10.
142. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802.
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which it is to be used. 4 ' The aid from the FBCI program is to be
used to promote the work of several federal initiatives aimed at
addressing public problems like crime, homelessness, lack of
health care, and lack of education.1 4 4 The Act's further stipulation that it constitutes neither aid to nor endorsement of religion
provides additional assurance that "funds and other assistance"
will be suitably content-neutral. 45 Finally, the Act expressly prohibits its aid from being applied to religious activities including
"sectarian instruction, worship, or proselytization." 4 6 All of this
guidance regarding the aid's intended use should adequately
ensure that its content will be neutral.
Because the aid offered by the Act is content-neutral, the
next step is to determine whether such aid will nonetheless be
diverted to religious uses. 1 4 7 At this point it is helpful to recall
that the Court does not presume aid will be improperly diverted.
In fact it makes the opposite presumption, treating its partner
organizations as good faith trustees. 4 8 Proof of actual diversion,
not mere divertibility, is required
to support a claim of an Estab1 49
lishment Clause violation.

Moreover, the Mitchell concurrence indicates that this diversion inquiry needs only be made when the aid involved flows
directly to a religious organization.15 ° This, of course, raises the
direct/indirect aid distinction. The Act would provide both
direct and indirect aid to private religious and secular charities."' Therefore it is necessary to determine if the Act impermissibly allows direct aid to be diverted to religious uses.
As noted above in the discussion about content neutrality,
the Act contains several provisions that give instructions on
proper use of direct aid. The aid is to be used to promote federal social welfare programs in furtherance of secular objectives. 1 5 2 Furthermore, the Act prohibits
aid from
being applied to religious activities like government
"sectarian instruction,
143. H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201(c)(2)(3) (2001) (describing "funds or
other assistance").
144. See id. § 201 (c) (4).
145. Id. § 201 (c) (2) (3).
146. Id. § 201(j).
147. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857.
148. See id. at 863-64.
149. Id. at 858.
150. Id. at 841 (noting that in Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1 (1993), the aid facilitated religious instruction, but these uses were permitted
because they occurred due to the independent choices of private individuals).
151. SeeH.R. 7,§201(h)(1)(2).
152. See id. § 201 (c) (4).
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worship, or proselytization."1' '
Private organizations receiving
direct aid under the FBCI program should not be confused by
the Act's plain language. They will know that the government
aid is to be used to further secular purposes. Because of the Act's
clear secular use guidelines, and because of the Court's presumption of compliance with them, the FBCI program passes what
might be called the "no actual diversion" test.
2.

Does the FBCI Proposal Distribute Aid on a ReligionNeutral Basis?

A second way in which government aid programs can cause
religious indoctrination is if these programs identify aid recipients on the basis of religion.' 5 4 There are two reasons for this
principle. First, if the government distributes aid to recipients
based on their religious affiliation (or lack thereof) it sends a
strong message of endorsement and any indoctrination that
results from the aid can be easily attributed to the government. 15 5 Second, religiously biased distribution criteria might
create financial incentives for individuals or organizations to
156
alter their religious beliefs or practices.
The Act is carefully drafted to prevent any religious bias
from entering into its distribution calculus. Its overriding purpose is to improve the government's ability to deliver social services to needy individuals and families. It recognizes that one
way to accomplish this is to expand the government's network of
private charitable partners. Logically enough, the Act contends
that an efficient way to expand this network is for government to
cooperate with all effective charitable organizations regardless of
their religious or nonreligious affiliations.' 57 It defies reason to
argue that an act that expressly rejects discrimination based on
religion (which the FBCI proposal does) could result in religionbased distribution.
But even though the Act prescribes a facially neutral set of
distribution criteria, it still must guard against creating incentives
for aid recipients to alter their religious beliefs or practices. The
Act does this by prohibiting the flow of aid to any private program that discriminates against the individuals and families it
serves on the basis of religion. Specifically, the Act declares that
service providers receiving federal FBCI funds shall not discrimi153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. § 201(j).
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1997).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
See H.R. 7, § 201 (b)(1)-(5).
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nate against those seeking assistance on the basis of "religion, a
religious belief, or a refusal to hold a religious belief."' 5 8 In practice, this means that if a soup kitchen run by a Christian church
accepts federal FBCI aid, it must feed not only fellow Christians,
but also people who profess other faiths, or no faith at all.
The Act offers still another important protection against
religious coercion. If any person eligible for social services under
the FBCI program objects to the religious nature of a service provider, the government entity overseeing the project must provide
alternative services to which the individual has no religious objection. "59
' To ensure that this provision is an effective safeguard,
the supervising governmental body must provide notice of this
right to all those receiving assistance. 6 '
Still, there may be some concern that individuals adhering
to less common religions will encounter much more difficulty
obtaining services from a provider that shares their faith. But the
Act helps to address this issue. It provides for training and technical assistance programs with a mandatory priority on training
small organizations to obtain funding and comply with federal
regulations.16 ' This emphasis on assisting smaller organizations
reflects the Act's overall commitment to neutrality, inclusion,
and nondiscrimination. Training of this type will help level the
charitable playing field. Smaller groups such as Buddhists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Muslims will be able to serve alongside
larger, better-connected organizations like the Southern Baptist
Convention and Roman Catholic Church. Under these guidelines it is difficult to imagine a scenario where a person would be
subjected to unwanted religious influence.
3.

Does the FBCI Program Result in Excessive Entanglement
of Government and Religion?

The principle that guides this inquiry is that the Court will
presume good faith compliance by religious organizations that
participate in neutral aid programs. 6 2 As a result of this good
faith presumption, there is no need for the government to
engage in intrusive monitoring of its religiously affiliated partners. 63 The monitoring mechanisms prescribed by the Act for
FBCI participants help to ensure compliance while avoiding
158.

Id. §201(h)(1)(2).

159. Id. § 201(g)(1).
160. Id. § 201 (g) (2).
161. Id. § 201(o)(1)-(4).
162.

Agostoni v.Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).

163. Id.
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excessive entanglement. Religious organizations receiving funds
under the FBCI program must account for their use of those
funds using the same methods that participating secular groups
must use.1 6 4 In this way, religious groups are not singled out for
extra rigorous investigation that could lead to entanglement.
Furthermore, religious groups are required to conduct
annual self-audits checking for compliance with the Act's regulations. At first glance this may appear to be a case of the fox
guarding the henhouse, but the Act addresses this concern by
requiring religious groups directly receiving federal funds to permit the government to conduct a full audit of how these funds
have been spent.'6 5 In summary, the Act's provisions for governmental oversight comport with the Court's decisions by requiring
compliance without causing excessive entanglement between
religion and government.
V.

CONCLUSION

Applying tests established by Agostini and Mitchell, the FBCI
program complies with the restrictions of the Establishment
Clause. As with any federal program, there may be isolated cases
where participants fail to comply fully with the regulations. But
these can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and the possibility
of occasional deviations presents no more reason to discard the
FBCI program than any other federal venture.
The Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
not without its critics. Commonly, their criticisms are directed at
the Court's adoption of a neutrality analysis16 6 and its willingness
to distinguish between direct and indirect aid to religion. 167 The
critics contend that distribution of public aid based on religionneutral criteria does not sufficiently guard against government
support of religion.' 68 The Establishment Clause was meant to
protect individuals from having their tax dollars spent to support
religion. Such government spending would "cause profound
divisiveness and offense," or so the argument goes. 69
164. H.R. 7, § 201 (i) (1).
165. Id. § 201(i)(2).
166. For examples of this neutrality analysis see Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793 (1999); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203; and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
167. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 195, 208 (1992). For examples of the Court's making the direct/indirect
aid distinction see Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793; Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
168. Sullivan, supra note 167, at 209.
169. Id. at 209-10.
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Kathleen Sullivan has compared government expenditures
that reach religious organizations with the compulsory payment
of union dues that the Court restricted in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education. 7 ' In Abood, the Court held that public employees
could be compelled to contribute money to their union for collective bargaining activities, but not to pay for the union's other
forms of political and ideological speech.' 7 1 Sullivan concludes
that the Establishment Clause confers upon every taxpayer "a
kind of non-disclaimable Abood right72 .. .against government

expenditures in support of religion." 1
This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with Sullivan's own
analogy to the Abood case. In Abood, the Court limited the scope
of activity for which the union could compel financial support
from its publicly employed members.1 73 By establishing these
limitations, the Court set collective bargaining activities apart
from other union functions. This distinction was based at least in
part on the Court's understanding of what the proper role of the
employees' union was. 1 74 Essentially, the Court decided that
negotiating contracts on behalf of union employees was at the
heart of the union's reason for existing. Therefore, contract
negotiations could be
properly funded with compulsory
1 75
employee union dues.

Sullivan's reference to Abood exposes the error of her analysis. She says the Abood model does not apply to the religion context, and she articulates a strict separationist view of religion and
government. 176 This view fails to recognize that government can
and does achieve valid secular purposes while partnering with
various private organizations, including religious groups. The
Court has upheld programs in which religious groups receive
incidental benefits while the overall character of the program
addresses a public purpose and does
not give any special prefer17 7
ence to religion over non-religion.
Mitchell and Agostini upheld programs where the government offered educational aid to students in both public and pri170. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
171. Id. at 232, 237.
172. Sullivan, supra note 167, at 210.
173. Abood, 431 U.S. at 232, 237.
174. Id.
175. Id.

176. Sullivan, supra note 167, at 211 ("In my view, the Establishment
Clause uniquely privileges the right of conscientious objection to religious activity, speech, or expenditures by the government.").
177. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986).
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vate schools according to religiously neutral criteria. Although
private religious schools, or at least some students who attended
those schools, benefited from the government funding, the
Court correctly recognized that the neutral aid programs were
aimed at achieving a valid public purpose: promotion of education in secular subjects. Just as union members in Abood could be
compelled to contribute to collective bargaining efforts, so too
can taxpayers be compelled to fund government programs
addressing secular purposes in a religiously-neutral manner. The
FBCI proposal aids the homeless, the hungry and the unemployed. It does so without discriminating based on the religious
affiliations of aid recipients or providers. It would be bad policy
and worse law to allow erroneous notions of strict separationism
to prevent the FBCI program from achieving these valid
purposes.
The Charitable Choice Act of 2001 embodies the essential
principles of the Establishment Clause and of the First Amendment as a whole. It honors the notion that all persons should be
free to choose their own religious beliefs, even if that means
rejecting religion altogether. The Act also reaffirms a commitment to true government neutrality toward the sacred and secular. Under the FBCI program, all charitable groups would be
evaluated not on their religiosity, but on their abilities to provide
vital services for their neighbors in need. It is time to leave
behind strict separationism and its legacy of antireligious discrimination, and to embrace the better understanding of the
Establishment Clause to which Agostini and Mitchell so wisely
point.

